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We employ a conversational genre of performative research in order to explore
foundational issues of language and design in information system practice.
Initially, Sir Geoffrey Vickers (2004), C. West Churchman (1999), Hans-Georg
Gadamer (1982) and Jurgen Habermas are portrayed as engaging in a
roundtable discussion on the topic: ‘‘Are there Limits to Language in Doing
System Design?’’ We employ an updated, AI-enhanced version of Memex, an
intelligent agent originally described by Vannevar Bush at the end of WWII, to
serve as a plausible digital platform for enabling a discussion among intelligent
agents, both living and dead. The Memex system conducts a spirited
conversation among the four scholars and later brings Pierre Bourdieu (
2002) and Bruno Latour into the discussion in order to enrich the unfolding
conversation. After the roundtable, Jurgen Habermas and Sir Geoffrey Vickers
synthesize the learning from their perspectives.
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Prologue
We are intrigued by an emerging approach to research in social science that
is rooted in a social constructionist sensibility (Gergen & Gergen, 2011) and
is often referred to as ‘‘practice-led research’’ (Smith & Dean, 2009; Haseman
& Maif, 2009; Rust et al 2007). The phrase practice-led emphasizes that the
action of making and doing things by practicing artists, designers, inventors,
architects and others who shape our sociomaterial world, should not just be
seen as a subject for study using our traditional research methods, but should
also be appreciated as unique research methods in their own right. The
practice-led research movement holds that the artifacts which we create
through our constructive practices while conducting practice-led research;
from designing novel digital systems to creating unique strategies; from
developing cities to inventing new types of built environment, can be
understood as research reports (Barrett & Bolt, 2007; Haseman, 2007;
Haseman & Maif, 2009). They are different from, but equivalent to our
traditional ways of communicating research through expository texts in
journal articles or through PowerPoint presentations at conferences.
The initial label of practice-led research seems to be appearing less often
and is being replaced by the label ‘‘performative research,’’ which we will
adopt here (Callon, 2007; Roberts, 2009; Jones, 2012; Oxman, 2008;
Denzin, 2001; Conquergood, 1989). Performative research reflects the
generative and expansive view of social science research opened up by
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Austin’s book How to do Things with Words (1962) and his
coining of the phase ‘‘performative utterance.’’ Schultze
& Orlikowski, (2010) present an interesting analysis of
what they refer to as the performative perspective and the
broad range of subject areas to which it is being applied,
from geography to psychology and beyond. We find
Haseman’s (2006) ‘‘A Manifesto for Performative
Research’’ to be an especially cogent and powerful
exposition of the importance of performative research
as a third category of research method, equal to those of
our currently recognized categories of quantitative and
qualitative research.
Ironically, it seems that the growing pressure to hold
education, including universities and their faculties,
accountable for their productivity is contributing to the
strength of the performative research movement. The UK,
for example, has established a Research Assessment Exer-
cise (RAE) conducted every 5 years with elaborate, detailed
evaluations of the quality of research being produced by
every department in every university, nationwide. The
difficulty of categorizing and assessing the quality of
research outcomes using only the traditional categories of
quantitative and qualitative methods, has led the UK RAE
to officially redefine ‘‘research’’ more broadly than those
two traditions generally recognize. In 1996, the Arts and
Humanities Research Council adopted an expanded def-
inition of research for the RAE, which now reads:
Research for the purpose of the RAE is to be understood as
original investigation undertaken in order to gain knowl-
edge and understanding. It includes work of direct relevance
to the needs of commerce and industry, as well as to the
public and voluntary sectors; scholarship, the invention and
generation of ideas, images, performances and artefacts
including design, where these lead to new or substantially
improved insights; and the use of existing knowledge in
experimental development to produce new or substantially
improved materials, devices, products and processes, includ-
ing design and construction. It excludes routine testing and
analysis of materials, components and processes, as distinct
from the development of new analytical techniques. (Broad-
head & Howard, 1998, p. 4)
Note that this way of defining research as an original
creation of knowledge and understanding is unapologet-
ically broad and inclusive. It reflects a pragmatist position
that true knowledge is useful in action to achieve human
goals and what constitutes a contribution to knowledge,
is based on that usefulness, not its conformance to the
web of preexisting theories and to elements of currently
accepted ones. It says that if the outcome of our inquiries
makes a difference in what we can achieve by new ways
of acting, valuing or understanding the world, it is a valid
research contribution.
The conversational genre of performative research that
we present here is enabled by a hypothetical, modern-day
form of Vannevar Bush’s Memex machine (Bush, 1945) – a
kind of deep learning machine that has the ability to create
intelligent agents based on the concepts, positions and
patterns of argument in the writings of particular scholars,
politicians, world leaders, writers, artists, public intellec-
tuals and other significant thinkers, whether living or
dead. The Memex in its appearance is similar to a 3-D video
conference in which the synthesized voices of the partic-
ipants are accompanied by animations of them.
In addition to an impressive breadth of knowledge based
on the latest scientific, artistic and literary accomplish-
ments of humankind, such intelligent agents are skilled in
rhetoric and argument and can provide a conversational
experience to support a decision maker’s sensemaking,
deliberations and choices. In this paper, the agents engage
in a conversation among themselves like trading algo-
rithms now compete in high-frequency trading. They
could also be conversing with live actors who use Memex
as an assistant, but for this experiment, the conversation is
only among agents generated by Memex.
The Memex conversation was chosen as our research
genre in order to bring the ideas of these authors to life
individually and in interaction in a way that cannot be
achieved in a ‘‘traditional’’ research paper. Whereas a
traditional research paper follows a logic of being coherent
and consistent in developing and presenting its argument
and thereby strives to produce the single persuasive voice
of an author, the research genre we employ here allows
the diverse logics of multiple perspectives to emerge in a
vibrating dialectic of claims, counterclaims, tensions and
omissions thereby creating a complex, dynamic landscape
of interacting perspectives. As such, the paper becomes
more like a novel and the argument becomes its plot,
emerging and being built as the reader seeks to infer what
is going on behind what is being said in the text.
The things these characters say are not quotations from
their writings, so there are no references to where these
statements are to be found. But, we believe that the
statements that Memex has given voice to reflect their key
ideas and personalities. Hence, the conversational genre
we employ represents a modest attempt by two scholars,
who have spent considerable time thinking about each of
these individuals’ writings, to let them engage in a rather
open-ended, Memex-enabled conversation and to see
what happens. In lieu of quotations, we provide references
to major sources that were consulted and used to test our
ideas while developing this conversation.
The conversational performance by Memex begins with
four agents created from the writings of four key scholars: C.
West Churchman (1968a, b, 1971), Hans-Georg Gadamer
(1976, 2004), Jurgen Habermas (1971, 1979, 1984) and Sir
Geoffrey Vickers (1965, 1970a, b). Later, Memex adds Bruno
Latour (1970, 1993, 1996) and Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu,
1977; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). They explore the
question: Are there limits to language in doing system
design? This is an important question because the work of
system design is about creating alternative futures possibly
with different values, by shaping the physical, intellectual
and social space in which human lives will be lived. By
systems design, we are referring to systems of information,
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of technologies and of organizing, as they exist in the
world at the time of our writing. The motivation for this
virtual conversation is to revisit the age-old question of
why so many information systems disappoint us. Why do
so many opportunities for human betterment through
application of information technologies go unrealized?
Why are so many digital systems not used to their full
potential? And finally, is this the best we can do?
The Conversation
GeoffreyVickers: I invited youto join this roundtablebecause
you are some of my favorite thinkers on issues relevant to
the design of information, organizations, technologies and
other systems that constitute our world, including their
socio-technical dimensions. I have a passion for seeking to
better understand the way those systems function and
interrelate in our increasingly complex world. And I invited
each of you for my own reasons.
Professor Churchman, I invited you because I admire
your work on developing a systems approach for critically
analyzing complex systems with a unique philosophical
position to guide a process of inquiry about them.
Professor Gadamer, I invited you because of your
significant thinking about systems and life as a living
tradition of meanings, which we can neither escape, nor
control. Your writings on philosophical hermeneutics
and the opening of our horizons toward each other
continue to inspire me every time I think about it.
I invited you, Professor Habermas, because of your
thorough and systematic attempts to develop a theory of
action and social organization based on a linguistic turn.
Your commitment to the importance of rational dialogue
in searching for and bringing into being a just and
humane world is an equally important reason for inviting
you. I believe your ideas are especially important in the
current social, economic and political conditions that we
face around the globe right now.
So you might say that I have chosen this group as a
reflection of how I would define myself. I am a retired
executive who served as head of the UK National Coal
Board, which shaped me as a pragmatist and system
thinker, focused on our immersion in language and
tradition. I recognize the socially imbued quality of the
multi-valued judgments we must make in designing and
managing technologies, organizations and information.
The topic I have proposed for our discussion today
reflects my own position that the language and cognitive
schemas that we as humans have evolved over the last
hundred thousand years or so, are now encountering a
new kind of environment – one of our own making, in
which we are increasingly blinded to the limits of
thought and action that we have created for ourselves.
I would like to start our discussion by exploring those
ideas a bit more fully and then open the conversation up
to your criticism and your own positions on language,
limits, systems and design. But first, I want to thank you
all for joining me in tonight’s roundtable discussion.
C. West Churchman: I am looking forward to it, but
wonder why you haven’t included some topics that are
central to your question. You haven’t, for instance,
mentioned ethics as an essential feature of any such
discussion.
Hans-Georg Gadamer: Well, I am a humanist and my
interest has always been in fighting against the barbarian
tendencies in our society that devalue tradition, human
values and the spirit of a culture. I see most technologies
and systems as undermining the great Western tradition
of humanity. So it is important that we incorporate the
value of a living tradition in our conversation, if I am to
be satisfied with it.
Jurgen Habermas: The issues you raise are among the
great challenges of modernity. I see in your opening
statement a central problem that I also am very con-
cerned about: namely, how systems colonize our lived
experience. This is related to a deeper question that I
have also sought to address throughout my life: Is there a
possibility for a rationality that is based on going beyond
a mere calculus of control and utility? Can we develop a
speech community that displays and values that rational-
ity in solving the chronic problems of our modern world?
Geoffrey Vickers: Excellent! Thank you all for that
supportive attitude. Let me open the discussion by
summarizing why I posed our topic as the ‘‘Limits to
Language.’’ I did so primarily because of a belief that all
systems have an inherent set of self-generated limits and
that those limits are associated with the characteristic
dynamics of that system. This, of course, is a general
system belief, and later I will identify some ways in which
I see system principles applying to language. But another
reason that I chose that title is Wittgenstein’s haunting
phrase from the end of the Tractatus, ‘‘The limits of my
language are the limits of my world.’’
That line is so evocative for me that I find it popping
into my thoughts all the time. So, both in the sense that
all complex systems, including the centrally important
one of language, self-generate limits (or have inner
contradictions) which we must grapple with everyday,
and also in the sense that we are contained in and bound
up by a linguistically generated reality, which creates
almost insurmountable difficulties for maintaining a
peaceful world, I felt that ‘‘Limits to Language’’ would
be an intriguing topic for us.
The limits to language that concern me most are: First,
the limits related to the collapse of our multi-valued
experience of human judgment into a single-valued
language of policy discourse and, second, the limits
resulting from a language that has evolved over many
millennia of rather slow change, confronting a world of
exceedingly rapid change. Let me discuss each of them
briefly. I believe we are limited in our ability to reason at
the policy level because we collapse judgments of what
we value and what constitutes a betterment for us given
those values, with judgments of what constitutes an
expansion of our resources or an increased efficiency in
our use of them.
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Judgments of betterment are political judgments
(polis), and judgments of expansion are economic judg-
ments (techne), each having its own language and logic.
Yet, we collapse the judgment of betterment into the
judgment of expansion by relying on an economic
language as the sole language for thinking through
system questions of organization and design. We don’t
use a language of politics to discuss values in our
judgments of betterment, and our organizations are
worse off for it – especially in their uses of technology.
C. West Churchman: Are you saying that you disagree
with the ‘‘Weltanschauung’’ or ‘‘worldview’’ of science and
management scientists, which I have discussed at length?
Geoffrey Vickers: I’m saying more than that – I am
saying that our language is inadequate to our task as
responsible actors in today’s world. It isn’t just a question
of our worldview. Our language, having collapsed judg-
ments of betterment into an economic vocabulary of
expansion, fools us into using a trajectory-like image for
guiding our thinking about design, management and
organization, regardless of our worldview. We are dom-
inated by images of directionality, especially upward
thrust, rather than images of evolutionary adaptation. In
essence, the guiding imagery of our language is based on
growth and forward motion rather than balance and
adjustment.
As a result of that peculiar linguistic dominance, our
language and its related mental schemata hide from us
the systemic properties of self-generated limits in social
systems and of the need for creating more cybernetic-
aware vocabularies for use in policy discourse. We go
around changing the world to suit ourselves and mistak-
enly believe that we are expanding our opportunities
rather than limiting them. We believe our increasing use
of technology is giving us increased power and control.
We don’t see that it is really creating new forms of
instability in our social systems and that those instabil-
ities become the source of new problems, which we then
address with the same misguided logics of expansion and
control.
Hans-Georg Gadamer: I agree with you that our current
thinking is limited in its view of language and has only a
minimal understanding of the limits to language. Hence,
the discourse on managerial decision making ignores the
idea of polis and sees it as techne only. Yet, everything we
experience and make sense of in our world is mediated by
our language.
As I have said: Language is the house of my being –
there is nothing outside the lived experience of language
– it is fundamental to all human existence. Therefore,
cutting the language of management off from the full
living tradition of human experience and human judg-
ment means reducing our potential for a full human life.
We are also blinded and incapable of expanding and
renewing our living tradition. In fact, we cannot even
generate new and important questions by which we
could approach our experience and history. Instead, we
can only ask a limited set of questions in the face of so
many new technologies and systems that emasculate our
experience and life. Simply put, our tradition is decaying
and we are moving to a barbarian state dominated by
techne.
Jurgen Habermas: I must say that I am not as pessimistic
as my esteemed countryman about the future potential of
our world and its capacity for managerial response.
Although I see that the language of cybernetics may be
too limited to address the issue we are talking about here
– in which I totally side with Professor Gadamer – I am
more optimistic about how, even though language
pervades all realms of human action, it can and must
overcome its technocratic straitjacket. As I see it, we do
indeed need modes of language use that can approach
the world with the idea of control and efficiency and a
calculus of utilities applied to outcomes of action. This is
necessary for freeing us from the limits and whims of
nature. But this is not enough for a full human project.
We must also create modes of language that enable us to
live our life meaningfully with our fellowmen. Only then
can we understand the conditions of being a human being
– the question Aristotle clearly posed when he separated
techne from polis. It is only in this context that the idea of
right and wrong and our mode of justifying action come
into focus. The great tragedy of modernity is that our life-
world has become colonized by the system logic of money
and control, in which human values are becoming lost.
Our language blinds us to see only what it lets us see, yet
we believe that it enables us to see everything.
To overcome this danger we must admit the universal
nature of language as a medium and means for rational-
ity, which includes submitting to the force of the better
argument and seeking to be freed from vested interests
and domination. Our language has limits, but these
limits are not closed forever and for everyone; rather they
are partially determined by the social conditions that
non-reflectively produce them, but we can overcome
those limits through reflective effort. We don’t see
everything, but with careful reflection, we can see more
and see it more clearly.
Memex: I am taking an executive action by bringing
Pierre Bourdieu into the conversation. He has been
texting me since you began, asking to be allowed in. I
anticipate it will be a better discussion if he participates.
Pierre Bourdieu: Thank you for letting me join, it is a
great privilege for me to interact with all of you. I would
like to state right at the beginning that I take the limits to
language to be quite different than what has so far been
proposed, especially if we mean to reflect on the practice
of organizational work. I think we need to step down
from the abstract world of your ideal constructs and
explore what people actually do in organizations with
their language and technologies and how these accom-
plishments create necessary and non-necessary bound-
aries for our talk about those practices. If organizational
work means the construction of practices in organiza-
tions, then I think it is much more appropriate for us to
step back from suppositions about language structures
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and look carefully at the field in which that language
operates, especially the struggle for power in that field
and the ways in which organizational work is a structur-
ing structure.
By that I mean that we must attend to the ways in
which system work is the reproduction of power relations
and the redistribution of capital in organizational fields,
and how language is the most important medium in this
struggle. Language has a structure, which shapes the
ongoing creation of other structures. In this way, systems
of social organization and technologies become structur-
ing structures, and in so doing, they objectify the
subjectivity which Vickers prizes so much.
If there is a limit to language, it is found in the ways in
which individuals come to believe that their habitus –
their orientations, expectancies and readiness to act – are
a universal subjectivity rather than a localized field of
practice in which their particular subjectivity is gener-
ated, through a dynamic interplay of binary oppositions
that mark significant positions in their field and provide a
basis for the forms and distribution of its capital. In other
words, it isn’t the logic of the actor, the tradition or the
universal pragmatics of language, but the logic of their
practice in its field that is going to generate the propen-
sities of that field that we must consider if we are to
explore the limits to language in doing systems design.
C. West Churchman: I feel that you are at once too close
to the ground with your talk of local practices and fields
and too far from the real problem with your talk of
structured structuring structures. Yes, we have habitus
and fields, or as I prefer to say, ‘‘Weltanschauungs,’’ but
that is a condition for the operation of reason, and it is
the operation of reason that we must pay attention to
here. In this sense I side with Habermas that we must
redeem and defend reason as the ultimate ground of any
limits to language. If there are limits to language, they
will make a difference in what matters most – our choices
– or they will make no difference at all. And the central
requirement for making good choices is for our reasoning
to have a guarantor.
The guarantor of reason in language use will ultimately
be concerned with finding a way to, as it were, swallow
the whole of systems, including technologies, informa-
tion and organization – all of both polis and techne. By
this I mean that reasoned choices, to be rational in any
meaningful sense, must be choices which consider the
whole relevant system and choose from the full set of
available alternatives. That guarantor must also offer us a
compelling logic as to why and how we design and
choose those specific alternatives.
So it is not the thing that someone does or wants to do
that determines its rationality, but all the things that
they do not do or not choose to do. It is the continued
construction of the missing alternatives that we could
choose from among, that we should be paying attention
to, if we are serious about the real limits of language. In
this regard the idea of conditions in which language is
used freely – the ideal speech situation – is an excellent
contribution to our thinking about our limits to language
and the implications for systems design. But another
consideration is the recursive and complementary nature
of different inquiring systems that we mobilize in those
debates.
Looking at practices may be of some relevance in the
modeling of systems, but it is on the modeling of our
world and of worlds other than ours, through the use of
alternative inquiring systems, that we must focus, not on
practice as it is today. Modeling of possible worlds and
inquiry into their functioning as wholes, where debates
emerge and are conducted with good will, is what will
enable us to create a more enduring and beautiful world.
In the end, this is what doing systems and organizational
design is all about.
Pierre Bourdieu: All the other possible worlds??… and
their alternatives?!.. Worlds other than our own?… Such
bizarre and uniquely American ideas of ‘‘boundless fron-
tiers’’ and manifest destiny. The logic of practice is always
very heavily constrained when our habitus, as subjective
memory, meets the objectivity of a field. Our history is
brought forward into the present in our habitus, or
through living tradition as the esteemed Professor Gada-
mer would say. We face the field we are located in as an
objectified structure – a tradition – that we cannot
reinvent. The result of this encounter with a field is an
objective set of probabilities for alternative paths that a
practice can take, not an open world of ‘‘anything goes’’ or
one where we unilaterally can decide what is best for us or
for others. Here the structuring structure can act as a
springboard for the types of questions that we will ask in
these encounters and thus condition how systems and
relations are organized differently.
Memex: Sorry to disturb your conversation again, but I
promise this will be the last interruption. Among the
many distinguished agents following this most interest-
ing roundtable is Bruno Latour. I have rejected all other
requests to participate in it, but feel compelled to allow
him to join for the sake of a more comprehensive set of
voices in the roundtable discussion.
Bruno Latour: Thank you for those kind words. If I may
sneak in a word edgewise here, I am fascinated and also
humbled by the incredibly detailed knowledge and
precise expression you all possess about something I find
utterly mysterious. The words you have been using with
such abandon – words like society, structures, policy,
ideals, tradition, polis and so on are completely beyond
my humble ability to use as deftly as you do. My
vocabulary in comparison is quite poor. I don’t know
how to begin dealing with these invisible things you
seem to take for granted – where can I go and observe
them? What door should I open so that I can learn to
know them in this amazing way?
I know it’s tempting to speak of such imaginary things
as if they had a certain causal power in our life. These
kinds of fetishes can perhaps bring some piece of mind or
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at least provide a handy pivot point for your arguments,
but they should be resisted if we are to say something
interesting about technology, language and organizing.
When I told my friend Barbara Czarniawska that you
were going to have a roundtable on the limits to
language, she immediately shouted: ‘‘There are no limits
to language! We are always saying new things, always
inventing new words, creating new forms of expression
and new genres!’’ And, of course, she is right, but I do see
even in your discussion so far this evening how particular
ways in which the participants use language sets limits
for our thinking. Sir Vickers, for instance, argues that our
language tricks us into thinking about trajectories when
we really should be thinking about evolutionary adapt-
ability. But either way, whether it is a mythical journey to
greater heights, or whether it is sexual reproduction
making us ever more fit as a species, you end up fixated
on an imaginary essence without realizing how that
essence is necessarily tangled up in all manner of
mysterious, invisible causal explanations.
Professor Bourdieu for his part is limited by the very
precision of his language: So that fields, habitus, forms of
capital, positions and power struggles become a land-
scape from which he cannot escape to simply look
around and consider what other things might be going
on in creating language, organization and technologies.
What a dreary, predetermined world this language of
practice becomes, in which we explain everything, yet we
understand nothing, and in which we purify our prede-
termined analysis with reflexivity on our own reflexivity.
These reverberating reflexive shadows do not help our
eyesight. Instead, it is a humble, open set of eyes and ears
we need in studying language in doing system work.
Churchman wants us to be able to see wholes – but the
social world we live in is flat and indivisible. There is no
place one can stand to see wholes or anything like them
in this flat world of ours. There are no lumpy, abstract
high points in the landscape: A closely limited horizon of
local situations is all we can see and navigate within. So
immediately his language limits us to the unseen, the
unspeakable and the unreachable. This, I hope you will
all agree, is a pretty severe limit.
With regard to Professors Habermas and Gadamer I
have very little to say as my humble mind has never
reached those heights of German philosophy. What can
I, a sociologist from a French mining university, say to
two of the grandest philosophers of our past century?
Whose intellectual edifice is so high and has so many
rooms that I do not know where to start opening the
doors? I see no living traditions and I see no forces of
better argument. I see only tricks, persuasions, connec-
tions and artifacts that are mobilized in these vibrating
networks of actors and actants. The story here is that
there is no grand story – we are no longer modern.
Pierre Bourdieu: Professor Latour is a bit too flamboyant
for my taste and his false modesty of how little we know
about organizations and systems is not well founded. I do
know something about information, technology, design
and organizations. I know, and I believe anyone who
takes the trouble to collect and quantify and categorize
the relevant data in as exhaustive and careful a manner as
I have, will also know certain things about the fields,
habitus and practice involved. The field of the technol-
ogy analyst is a globalized professional field in which
consultant/designers struggle for the cultural capital of
intellectual achievement and for economic capital. The
field of the worker is principally a local organizational
field in which workers struggle primarily for the social
capital of affiliation and the financial capital of rewards.
From this view, the problem of implementation is readily
apparent. The logic of practice of the consultant/designer
expects that workers should be readily willing to make some
simple change in daily routines because it is a rational
response to the functional requirements of accumulating
intellectual capital. For the worker, embedded in a gener-
ative cycle of social and financial capital-based practices, a
change that is considered minor by the designer is in fact a
threatening disruption of their life and their very position
in the field. It is a robbing of the very relations and
conditions on which their capital is based.
I further know that the consultant/designer and the
worker are in fields with different temporal rhythms. For
the worker it is a rhythm of short cycles and many
repetitions per day. For the designer it is a long-cycle
rhythm with weeks or months between milestones and
repetitions. For the worker it is a rhythm of familiarity –
for the designer a rhythm of novelty. The designer moves
freely through a global professional space, while the
worker is generally confined to a local market of limited
movement. And I could go on and on with these things
we know quite clearly about information, technology,
systems and organizations. It is not so mysterious as you
claim and there is a very clear sense of what design is all
about in this field.
C. West Churchman: I agree with you on that last point,
at least. But in my own defense, I know that the designer
does have to act. As befuddling as the situation might
seem, designers have to muster the courage and the
moral judgment to model the whole as best they can,
recognizing the inferential leaps involved, and the diffi-
cultly of making a choice. Imperfect as this sounds, and
difficult as the limits to language we have all identified
make it, in the end, the designer has to act and he has to
act responsibly. Because of that, I know that reason as a
guarantor for the designer’s action is the foundational
problem of language that we must address.
There is a peculiar sense in which all of you are using
vocabularies that are implicitly claiming to let us hear or
see organizations as they really are. Of course, you know I
reject that claim, but what are we left with? What kind of
conversation do we make with all these vocabularies
overturning and undermining each other? I think of
Wittgenstein’s comment on language as a tool box from
the Philosophical Investigations: ‘‘And how many kinds
of sentences are there? Countless kinds. Think of the
tools in a tool box.’’
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I would like us to think of the different vocabularies we
have displayed here tonight not as contestants in a
competition to see who is right or who is closest to
getting the correct description of technology or organi-
zation or system design, but as tools available to a
discerning crew of workers doing system work. Or
perhaps we should think of them as voices in a chorus
where the thing we try to get right, as it were, is the
harmonious blending of voices – the aesthetics of repre-
sentation that we can interweave with these diverse
voices – like Bach’s great oratories. We must also explore
whether the voices in this chorus can open us to invite in
other vocabularies of representation including sound,
visual imagery, art and even dance.
I like Barbara Czarniawska’s intuition about the ques-
tion of limits to language. There are limits to language
only if we let there be limits. As Professor Habermas
points out: We should not shut off other voices and close
off our conversations because we fear they might lead to
dead ends or go against our vested interests. But, of
course, this may leave us in a self-made dead end, because
we began conversing only with those who prefer our own
favorite vocabulary or rules of engagement. Keeping the
conversation going with an open and changing chorus of
vocabularies is the best way I know of to keep language
free of limits.
Geoffrey Vickers: This notion of music, imagery and art
is one point I strongly agree with. I’ve always felt that
there are multiple forms of consciousness at work in the
way judgments are actually made in organizations. I’ve
always thought that multiple kinds of sensations were
constitutive of what I call appreciative judgments, which
is when our judgments of reality and our judgments of
value are brought together in a multi-valued judgment of
fit. We know something is the correct thing to do not
because of logic alone, but because of an appreciative
judgment of fit between multiple values and reality.
Appreciative judgment of fit rests on aesthetics and on
the use of all of our senses in determining appropriate-
ness and desirability. Appreciative judgment is what
drives action, not rational choice.
Bruno Latour: But you know, Sir Vickers, as I sit here
listening to you, it suddenly hits me how you yourself are
trapped in a limited vocabulary of associating thinking
and reasoning as something that happens in our heads
and something that takes place in words. I much prefer to
think of thinking as something we do with our hands and
our bodies. As Hutchins shows so beautifully, our cogni-
tion is a distributed cognition in which humans and
artifacts together create calculation and intelligent per-
formance – a thing which most Western philosophy has
ignored since Descartes.
It is as if humans have no body, only brains and they
can mostly only see or hear text. So rather than being
trapped into a confusing vocabulary based on a thinking
mind without a body, as you seem to be when you ask us
to keep our thinking open by keeping our vocabularies
open, I would much rather have us consider thinking and
mind as something we make together, using our bodies
in relation to artifacts, handwork, physical motion,
tactile manipulation, inscriptions and, of course, words
as well. The focus would then be on the making of
cognition and action in as open a way as possible, not
just blending minds’ diverse voices as if they were ready
manufactured in our brains.
To pick up on the tool metaphor you started to develop
but then dropped, I would like us to think of system work
as a tool-based collective work. The tools we use in this
work are multiple professional languages, and the kinds
of tools we are able to put our hands on are the
vocabularies and other artifacts that are mobilized
through the deployment of those vocabularies. It is not
just the words we use but all the things we do with them,
with our bodies and our hands that do the thinking, and
in that sense, the language of system work is the network
of actors and actants that are mobilized through these
multiple vocabularies.
Maybe if we could see a kind of motion picture of the
system worker, close-up, it would help us see how unique
and singular each site of system work is and how it sets in
motion multiple different actors and their scripts. If there
are limits to this handwork language, they are to be
found in each filming location where the actors are
making their own contexts and their own scripts as they
make the organization and its information systems. So
there are only local limits, and local limits will prevail in
language use.
Pierre Bourdieu: Yes, there is a sense in which there are
only local limits, but this is true in a trivial sense, only – a
sense in which the langue and parole of language are
confused. The local, situated use (parole) of language
(langue) will always be a limit in a superficial sense. But in
a generative sense, in the only truly important sense, the
structuring structure of language, its langue, is the
determining language operation. Only langue and the
structure of its binary oppositions set the limits to
language that will prevail.
C. West Churchman: I feel that in my saying what I
conclude about language, I have ended up being mis-
characterized here, and perhaps at some later time that is
a part of the limits to language that I will think about
further. But for now, what I must point out is how my
discussions about reason, guarantors and the need for a
sense of the whole system, have turned out to mask
something even more important in my views on lan-
guage and their limits – something that serves as my
ontological grounding and is in stark contrast to Profes-
sors Bourdieu and Latour.
Reason, guarantors or a sense of whole are not the
wellspring of my thinking – they are merely the best
conclusion I can reach, using both logic and emotion.
The wellspring for my thinking is the individual human
being: the lonely, isolated, mortal, struggling, flesh and
blood human being who makes choices and acts – that is
what requires reason, a sense of whole and a guarantor.
And that foundation of the singular, passionate, morally
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responsible and often anguished human being from
which I draw my conclusions is missing from both your
arguments. I am a humanist, pure and simple, and I am
proud of it. I reject what both Latour and Bourdieu have
said – realizing that they disagree between themselves
quite strongly, but seeing each of them in their own way
as having lost sight of the primacy of the individual.
Latour accuses me of looking to the imaginary and the
unknowable for the operation of reason. But he, in turn,
has made the individual disappear in favor of a circulat-
ing network of humans and artifacts, any node of which
is subject to mediation and translations of interests.
Bourdieu makes the individual disappear into recursively
reproduced practices, where habits replace the passion
and will of the singularly potent person. Give me the
flesh and blood, the agonizing existential reality, of a
human being facing the dread of everyday responsibili-
ties. That’s where I want to start. That is what is real: the
individual human actor answering to God and the future
of humankind for her actions.
Hans-Georg Gadamer: I must side with Professor
Churchman here, but with a twist and a reformulation.
As I said in the start of this conversation, I too am a
humanist – I have always been a humanist and I am
proud of it! Therefore, all this technospeak is quite alien
to me, and I felt uncomfortable to participate in a project
like this, but I decided to do so because I want to defend
humanism as our only hope for a meaningful life.
What I see coming from today’s technologies, infor-
mation and systems is just the opposite: It has made our
culture banal, and it has commercialized all experience
and narrowed down our sense of history by weakening
the effect of tradition. Therefore, assuming that individ-
uals make choices is the first hope for strengthening
humanism. But I must go against the idea that individ-
uals in the end make decisions freely. It is the effective
history of tradition which binds these humans and which
enables the individuals to move to a new understanding,
which, in turn, opens us to new meanings. Individuals
outside of and without tradition remain powerless; they
do not participate and live the making of history.
Memex: Sorry to disturb your conversation again. It
looks that our time allocated to this debate is running
out. We are reaching our computing quota in the cloud.
Therefore, I must reject all requests by other participants
to continue their statements. Instead I have asked
Professor Habermas to provide us a closing statement,
because he is well known as a great synthesizer of
philosophical and social theories of the twentieth cen-
tury. So please professor Habermas, the floor is yours.
Jurgen Habermas: Thank you for this great honor and
challenge. As I said a few minutes ago, I see myself as a
humanist who tries to understand the social, political
and technological challenges in our age of late capital-
ism. Due to the complexity of this form of society,
articulating a humanistic stance will take some time. So
forgive me for this longer statement putting together so
many different strands of thought which have been
expressed here. It will not be easy to find a way out of this
maze. First, and most importantly, for me personally,
humanism is not the simple idea of making choices and
being free. It is instead, the hope that we can avoid
another round of holocaust – the horrors of which
shaped my youth. We are always faced with the agoniz-
ing responsibility of not repeating that history. Nothing
could be more daunting or more critical. Therefore, when
I say I am a humanist, I mean that my understanding of
the world centers on the idea of an individual and his or
her moral responsibility toward other human beings and
also toward nature. Everything flows from that core
commitment.
Yet, no matter how beautiful and brave that idea is, as a
belief it is powerless unless we amplify it with an
appreciation for the necessity of critical discourse and
an abiding belief that things can be made better on
rational grounds. The future is always open to us; unlike
the laws of nature, the laws of society can be altered
through rational discourse leading to decisions about
how we will make and remake our future. In other words,
the humanism I refer to combines taking design action
and taking a rational stance. This enables us to see that
designers agonize about how things can be otherwise on
a rational basis – one of the major arguments that my
mentor Adorno constantly repeated. Asking the question
of how things could be otherwise, invites us to explore
how power and domination shape our thought and
action, how some voices are not heard and not allowed to
be heard, and the ways in which our communications are
distorted.
There is another aspect to design and systems of any
sort, which relates to the question of what is the ‘‘world’’
that we are designing and projecting ourselves into? Only
the most naı¨ve engineers think that design is just the
reconfiguration of the external world and is about
gaining better control over it. There is no sense of beauty
or justice or truthful world in such an idea. Today, the
language of design that we employ is very limited and
crude – it does not matter whether we are engineering
atoms, bits, molecules, emotions or social bonds. It’s all
the same and unfortunately it seems that more and more
we think and act as if they are all the same. This attitude
can be useful when thinking about effectively organizing
social life and processes. But, when it is allowed to run
amok – as it increasingly seems to be – it will create a
system world colonized by blind power and money.
I see Bourdieu’s idea of fields and power relations to be
a good representation of how our world of design will be
cynically seen, if we assume that only self-interest (or no
interest) and the engineering of social bonds prevail. For
some, societies and their design resemble programming
genetically or conditioning human ant communities,
and we could become behavioral animals that can be
programmed with specific responses. I can see value in
such analysis for understanding the lower bound of
organizing. It is also very revealing as a theoretical lens to
view how social action (in its socio-technical and
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sociomaterial aspects) is theoretically analyzed in post-
modern societies. In the end, all that is human and
regarded as the social, is emasculated, trapped in an iron
cage, like a jungle of human ants.
I believe that Sir Vickers’ call for real politics and value
judgments with recognized (ethical) norms and values
that are morally binding is necessary in our critical
design of social systems. These norms are not easily
identified, controlled and manipulated, but they are the
foundation of social bonds, i.e., the social contract which
defines us as free men and women. With the idea of
contracts we can move beyond an image of humans as
ants in a jungle and treat humans as members of polis.
This shift requires our designs to coordinate action
between the world of social norms and the world of
things and objects. This is valuable and good as it raises
our understanding of how we limit our designs with the
specific languages we employ (or live through). But Sir
Vickers’ analysis still leaves open the question of how we
come to see these norms as morally binding. I believe in
the value of Gadamer’s notion of tradition and of the
horizon of meanings it implies. Tradition and the fusing
of horizons are what enable us to push back on the limits
to language as we ‘‘design’’ or rather ‘‘build’’ our life-
worlds. Norms make sense to us only when they are
mobilized in action, including acts of communication.
The possibility of an ideal conversation provides a basis
for all our norms and becomes standard expectations of
moral and rational human interactions (e.g., to use
language correctly, to be clear, to be truthful, to be
cooperative and to assume that we and others are
genuinely seeking truth). Those standards of an ideal
conversation are the conditions of possibility for a just
and humane society. And they are what is being under-
mined by the leaders of the so-called advanced world
today.
The idea of a living tradition assumes that our norms
will evolve and depend on our varying life-worlds. We are
not ants. We are designing, free moral beings who have
the capability to communicate and express our concerns
in ways that create normatively and ethically binding
contracts with rational justifications. I suspect that the
norms of ideal conversation are the only thing keeping
our designs and a design language moving forward.
Geoffrey Vickers: Well, those are some very pointed
remarks that none of us will easily forget. I can see why so
many are fearful of the era our world is entering. On the
other hand, forewarned is forearmed, and we have
surfaced and discussed some images of the present and
some ideas about the likely future that can be helpful to
those responsible for policy across all types of institu-
tions. I suggest that we share these ideas with others – not
just scholars, but activists, politicians, community lead-
ers, those in the media, and even the popular press. Our
group seems to have covered a lot of ground here in our
roundtable discussion, and Professor Habermas has con-
cisely captured some of its central underlying themes.
Due to the complexity of the ideas we have explored, I
am hesitant to try summarizing it in a concise way. But
that is the role I have agreed to perform, and in
Churchman’s powerful expression, I agonize about it
but will attempt to do it anyway.
One theme that runs from the beginning to the end of
our discussion is that of ethics, and the way it is central to
our ability to engage in ideal conversations, which are
the bedrock of our ability to create a vibrant, reliable
human community. A second theme is the contrasting
sources and implications of the humanist versus tech-
nocratist position. What the humanist sees as a coloniz-
ing of the life-world, the technocratist sees as a salvation
from pain, deprivation and bondage. It seems that this
important distinction in what Churchman has referred to
as our worldviews, is related to my own distinction
between two forms of policy setting – on the one hand, a
robust multi-valued choice that is understood as a process
of balancing competing forces, much like a dialectical
oscillation, and on the other hand, a linear, unidirec-
tional process of expansion and growth. I have made my
position clear on this dichotomy, but the question
remains, how can the current situation, with its
unfounded belief in the desirability of a linear, upward
trajectory of continuous growth, be displaced by the
more realistic belief in an evolutionary dynamic of
continuously balancing and rebalancing our desired
trajectory, as a preferred basis for setting public policy?
A third issue appears to be the role of interpersonal
language use and the image of an ideal conversation as a
way of expressing and resolving moral questions and
providing the basis for our development of accepted
norms. Here we encounter the possibility of grounding
ethics either through a kind of structured, rational
process of resolution with specified forms of discourse
to identify and agree upon a more fixed code of ethics, as
some of you prefer, or through a more casual conversa-
tion as a way of less methodically laying down a more
flexible ethics that can be shaped and reshaped in action
to fit the particular circumstances of changing situations
and system designs. We also appear to agree that
language forms the means by which the elements of a
design become related and by which the various types of
future worlds are imagined and constructed. At the same
time, we had several different opinions about how these
worlds come to be and on what grounds we can
distinguish between them and if we can escape the inner
contradictions that so many systems embody.
Some troubling, unresolved elements of our conversa-
tion will engage my thinking for a long time after this
roundtable ends. First, the notion that language is tricking
us into seeing the world in a particularly biased way, even
apart from any political or moral position we might hold.
Is there a way to overcome biases, or to know which biases
are positive and generative to a design and which ones are
not? How do we come to see the biases in language if we
are at the same time prisoners of that language?
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Second, are we able to construct and evaluate well-
founded arguments and create morally binding agree-
ments for design? Such agreements are required for a
rationality that goes beyond mere calculations of costs
and benefits as we engage in design.
Third, we all live in local worlds with unique situated
logics and specific language games. Does the inclusive-
ness and sense of whole desired by Churchman and
advocated by Habermas mean that our species’ success is
dependent on our being able to hold in dialectic tension
both poles of the global versus local logics that our
conversation today seems to imply? If so, how is that
possible for a sentient being striving to be rational in the
view of society?
There are other important issues that surfaced in our
roundtable today, but these three are the ones that I will
carry forward for personal consideration. Perhaps you
have other issues that you see as most critical, if so, I look
forward to hearing from you in the Memex blog sphere.
Epilogue
The initial writing of this piece dates back about 20 years.
The beginnings of a first draft were written during a very
pleasant week visiting at the University of Gothenburg
while attending a week-long series of workshops and
seminars. It was another 3 years before a rough draft of
most of the materials was developed. That version was
presented at an IFIP 8.2. research workshop, where a few
senior scholars in attendance acted as readers of the
characters as if they were rehearsing a play, and it
received some positive feedback. After that it was another
8 years or so before a full version with all the current
characters was developed and was performed by some
faculty from our university theater department along
with the authors. Based on the feedback, the text was
shortened and streamlined for clarity. Since then the
main narrative has stayed in the same basic form, while
the final expansion has focused on the prologue and
epilogue, clarifying the nature of the genre and dis-
cussing its value.
The first versions of the manuscript were neither
written nor anchored in the idea of conversational genre.
The idea of this genre emerged gradually when we tried
to jointly make sense of the value and inner logic of
writing in this form. The original text focused on
juxtaposing different thinker’s ideas about uses of lan-
guage and design into a serial flow of statements about
each one’s position and to demonstrate the relative
positions of each with regard to those of others. This
original idea is still present and is an important element
of the narrative.
The value and beauty of this style is that it forced us to
present the ideas as originating from the perspective and
conviction of an ‘‘I’’ – with each person talking his ideas
into being in a social setting rather than conveying ideas
in a neutral and distanced form of third-person writing
found in their main texts (although we recognize
that Latour has used a similar device and has had tech-
nology take roles and speak in his book, Aramis (Latour,
1996). We discovered that along with the use of ‘I’’ came
the possibility for characters to express affection, emo-
tion, humor and commitment toward their ideas.
Once the writing of the conversation started to build a
kind of rhythm, it allowed for differences between the
characters to emerge more naturally, and we found the
characters reacting to the statements and positions of
the others. In this way, the writing is not only about
what is being said and how the flow of ideas originates
and shifts, but also hints at how personal history,
context and character influence what is being said. We
naturally have not met or talked with all the characters
included in the play, but many of the statements, style
and idioms come from the presentations we have heard
by the authors or from the conversations we have had
with many of them. For others, we examined their
biographies to better understand their personal traits
and history.
Our desire to present the author’s ideas in a conversa-
tional form with an emergent expression and develop-
ment within the dynamics of their social interaction
pushed our writing to seek an authenticity grounded in
the statements made by each author to the others. In this
way we attempted to be faithful to how each author’s
ideas are being constructed as they are being conveyed.
This is primarily accomplished by the use of an interac-
tive conversational style that grounds each statement by
an individual within the developing context of what all
the participants are saying or not saying. Throughout
their conversation, each one is speaking in response to or
in anticipation of what the others have said or might be
about to say. As a result of using this dialogical form, the
manuscript emerges within and through the process
‘‘talking back and forth’’ rather than presenting the
authors position through a soliloquy.
By giving voice to one author at a time, we are
revealing the research process via the research product.
Recall from the prologue that this unique form of
transparency is a distinctive feature of performative
research. The research outcome is not presented in the
default expository text or PowerPoint presentation, but
instead is presented in the same symbolic system with
which it was constructed.
By allowing each voice to have its own way through
an iterative back-and-forth exchange, the research pro-
cess is a rich, heterogeneous and dialectic one in which
surprises can be expected and are not disruptive to the
logic when they occur. In traditional social science
research, the writing genres of expository texts present
the research as a coherent, cumulative argument in
which a uniform set of data is analyzed and a consis-
tent, well-formulated conclusion is produced. The con-
versational mode of performative research, in contrast,
appears incoherent to a traditional research audience
with quick jumps from one perspective to another,
highlighting multiple, different sets of data that can
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often incite emotionally charged positions, in which
surprising, counterintuitive claims can result. Instead of
the coherent sequence of theoretical grounding, argu-
ment development and conclusion justification found
in traditional forms of written qualitative and quantita-
tive research, the conversational mode of performative
research is one in which no one can know where the
thread of thought is likely to lead and the anticipation
of meaning can end in surprise.
The first-person style of the conversational form
presents each author’s ideas as innocent, emergent and
fleeting. The ideas never get forged into a final complete
form as found in written scientific articles. Authors’
personal statements do not portray the same quality of
intellectual authority as produced by the straight serial
logic of statements in traditional third-person writing of
scientific articles. The ideas come in tentative and
incomplete snips for discovery, contrast, expansion or
throwing-away. Ideas are being spoken by one participant
and listened to by other participants as they concurrently
react to what is said based on what they are interpretively
hearing. This generates a dialogical form of narrative that
is common in fiction, in plays and so on, but rare or
nonexistent in traditional scientific genres. Traditional
research genres, in contrast, have a mono-logical form:
One person (he/she) or a group of persons (we) make a
complete statement that has to be accepted as a whole or
not at all. The conversational genre of performative
research, in contrast, has continual shifts that reveal
tensions between the presented ideas and invite new
voices into its openings, reflected in the way that
speakers intermittently comment, expand and contrast
their ideas with those of others. Many of these moves are
unexpected and can push the conversational logic away
from the ‘‘tight’’ logic which was just presented by one of
the authors.
The conversational form thus emulates and sheds light
on the power of informal dialogue that fills the lives of all
scholars and forms the informal, hidden background of
all great scholarship. This is not the hermeneutics of
wholes and parts, but the hermeneutics that emerges
from juxtaposing different forms of ‘‘pre-understanding,’’
a colliding of alternative ‘‘meaning horizons.’’ The con-
versational form invites us to celebrate the value of
ambiguity and apparent incompleteness of the narrative
as for example summarized in three challenging ques-
tions posed by Sir Vicker’s at the end. What we gain from
this incomplete form is the generative power of fluidity
and heterogeneity of ideas and the fun and struggle we
will experience when the nascent, semi-confusing mean-
ing we are about to discover needs to be dressed in a new
presentation of shy, carefully formed tentative words.
The conversational mode of performative research ulti-
mately shows us that a life of ambiguity is what all
scholarship must honor and value. It is from such
surprising, seemingly incoherent moments where the
rare, creative sparks of intellectual discovery spring forth.
A performative turn in social science is one way to keep
its excitement and productivity vital and important to
humanity and to the project of designing better social
worlds.
Postscript
Habermas speaks to the others in a low, serious voice after
the meeting is over and coffee is being poured for the
audience.
Gentlemen, I have something to say that I feel I must
get off my chest. It is hard for me to talk so honestly
about such important matters without becoming agitated
about the implications. For the past year or two I have
been frightened. When the norms of ideal conversation
are ignored or actively broken by political leaders as we
are seeing today in the highest offices of the leading
nations, a downward spiral becomes more and more
likely. As standards of truth are diminished, language is
used to obfuscate, good intentions toward others are
extinguished, genuine cooperation for mutual benefit
with others is no longer expected, trust of others is
neither granted nor received, people do not believe that
others are genuinely seeking truth in their interactions, it
becomes more and more difficult to tell truth from
falsehood.
As a result, political, commercial or religious leaders do
not display the qualities of an ideal conversation in the
daily conduct of their duties. Quickly, they diminish
themselves, their office and their institutions. In govern-
ment, especially, they weaken the possibility for an
effective polis and they erode their own ability to be a
successful leader. As people lose their belief and trust in
democratic political systems, they are handing their
country over to demagogues and dictators. The thing I
have dedicated my life to stop from ever happening again
– a holocaust-like calamity – gets more and more likely by
the day.
But I will not give into my fear, and I hope none of you
will either. As Michel Foucault has so powerfully argued,
we can and must resist. All is never lost. If we can strongly
resist, the power of ideal conversation can dominate. But
we must resist. I’m getting old, and tired, but perhaps you
can help me spread awareness among the younger
generation.
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